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Abstract. Errors are inevitable in the implementation of any complex process.
Here we examine the effect of random errors on Single Transferable Vote (STV)
elections, a common approach to deciding multi-seat elections. It is usually ex-
pected that random errors should have nearly equal effects on all candidates, and
thus be fair. We find to the contrary that random errors can introduce systematic
bias into election results. This is because, even if the errors are random, votes
for different candidates occur in different patterns that are affected differently by
random errors. In the STV context, the most important effect of random errors is
to invalidate the ballot. This removes far more votes for those candidates whose
supporters tend to list a lot of preferences, because their ballots are much more
likely to be invalidated by random error. For close elections this systematic bias
can change the result of the election.
1 Introduction
We investigate the effects of random errors on election outcomes, in the context of pref-
erential elections counted using the Single Transferable Vote (STV). It is often assumed
that random errors (whether from human or manual counting) are unimportant because
they are likely to have nearly equal effects on all candidates. In this paper we show that
this is not the case, using simulated random errors introduced into real STV voting data.
In some cases, this introduces a systematic bias against some candidates.
Random errors have a non-random effect because real votes are not random. Voters not
only express different preferences, but express them in a different way, according to
who they choose to support.
In STV, some candidates are elected mainly on the strength of their party listing; others
rely on gathering preference flows from other candidates, or on their individual popu-
larity relative to other candidates from the same party. So when we look at the charac-
teristics of the votes that contributed to the election of different candidates, we find that
the types of votes chosen by their supporters may be very different. Hence a random
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error that affects different types of votes differently introduces a systemic change in the
election result.
One obvious kind of error is to misrecord a number. Usually, this either invalidates the
ballot completely, or invalidates its preferences below the error. The more preferences
there are on a ballot, the more likely that at least one of them is misrecorded. So as a
general rule, candidates that are more dependent on later preferences or long preference
lists are more severely disadvantaged by random errors.
Although these results are significant, and need to be taken into account for close con-
tests, we find that reasonable error rates produce changes only in very few elections,
which (so far) correspond only to those that are obviously very close. It is possible
for STV elections to have hidden small margins, but this seems to be uncommon—in
almost all the elections we simulated, no plausible error rate produced a change in out-
come. Typical random error rates will affect election results when the election is close,
but are not expected to do so when the election is not close.
We do not consider the errors necessary to alter the election result in a targeted way by
altering specific carefully chosen votes—they would obviously be much smaller. Hence
the results of this paper apply to random errors, but not deliberate electoral fraud.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we explain
STV elections, in particular in the case of Australian Senate elections, and discuss how
the votes are digitised and counted. In Section 3 we describe our experiment design
and introduce the three error models we explore. In Section 4 we provide a number of
different approaches to estimate the likely error rate that occurs for Australian Senate
elections. In Section 5 we examine the result of applying simulated errors to Australian
Senate elections and discuss how these errors can change the result of the election.
Finally in Section 6 we conclude.
2 Background on STV counting
2.1 The Single Transferable Vote (STV) counting algorithm
STV is a multi-winner preferential voting system. Candidates compete for s available
seats. A candidate is awarded a seat when their tally reaches or exceeds the quota, Q,
defined as a function of the number of ballots cast in the election, |B|, and the number
of seats, s. One popular definition is the Droop quota,
Q =
⌊ |B|
s+ 1
⌋
+ 1.
When a voter casts a ballot in one of these STV elections, they have the option of voting
‘above the line’ or ‘below the line’. Figure 1 shows an example of a ballot for a simple
STV election in which candidates from three parties are competing for s seats. Each
party or group of independents fielding candidates in the election have a box sitting
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: An example of two simple ballots for a 3-party STV election. In (a), the voter
has chosen to vote above the line, and in (b) they have voted below the line.
‘above the line’ (ATL). A voter may rank these parties and groups by placing a num-
ber in their corresponding box (Figure 1a). Alternatively, a voter may rank individual
candidates by placing a number in their box, below the line (BTL) (Figure 1b).
Tabulation starts by giving each candidate all the below-the-line ballots in which they
have been ranked first. ATL ballots are awarded to the first candidate listed under the
party that has been ranked first. For example, a ballot in which Party A has been ranked
first sits in the first preference pile of candidate a1. A BTL ballot in which candidate
b2 is ranked first sits in that candidate’s first preference pile. Each ballot is assigned a
weight, starting at 1, that changes as counting proceeds. The tally of a candidate is the
sum of the weights of ballots sitting in their tally pile, possibly with some rounding.
Counting proceeds by awarding a seat to all candidates whose tallies have reached or
exceeded Q. Their surplus—their tally after subtracting Q—is distributed to remaining
eligible candidates. A candidate is eligible if they have not been eliminated, and their
tally has not reached a quota’s worth of votes. The ballots sitting in an elected candi-
date’s tally pile are re-weighted so that their combined weight is equal to the candidate’s
surplus. These ballots are then given to the next most-preferred eligible candidate on
their ranking. The ATL ballot in Figure 1a is given to candidate a2 if a1 is elected to
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a seat. If neither a2 or a3 are eligible, the ballot then moves to candidate c1. The BTL
ballot in Figure 1b is given to candidate b1 if b2 were elected or eliminated.
In the event that no candidate has reached a quota, the candidate with the smallest tally
is eliminated. The ballots in their tally pile are distributed to the next most-preferred
eligible candidate in their rankings at their current weight.
Counting proceeds in rounds of election and elimination until all s seats are filled, or
until the number of candidates that remain eligible equals the number of remaining
seats. In this setting, each of the remaining candidates is awarded a seat.
2.2 Australian Vote digitisation in practice
Australians cast their votes on paper ballots. The Australian Electoral Commission
(AEC) digitises the preferences in a hybrid manual and automated process. Precise
details about this process are unavailable, but most ballots seem to receive both auto-
mated digitisation and secondary human data entry. (Ballots that are judged blank are
not re-examined.) It is possible that manual data entry is performed on ballot papers.7
Other pamphlets suggest that only the images, not the paper ballots, are used.8
An automated system then checks, for each ballot, whether the automated digitisation
matches the human interpretation. Obviously this does not defend against software er-
rors or deliberate manipulation, particularly downstream of the process, but it probably
does produce reasonably low random error rates, assuming that the human errors are
not highly correlated with the errors of the automated system.
Ballots are required to have a minimum number of preferences before they are consid-
ered valid; such ballots are referred to as formal ballots. In the 2016 and 2019 elections,
a BTL formal vote requires the preferences 1 to 6 inclusive to be uniquely present; an
ATL formal vote requires the preference 1 to be uniquely present and a formal BTL
vote not to be present. According to the information about the digitisation processes
mentioned above, non-blank informal ballots seem to get a second human inspection
automatically.
The AEC publishes on their website the complete digitised preferences for all Senate
votes, excluding blanks and votes judged to be informal.
In summary, the published data could differ from the actual ballots for many reasons:
– random errors that match in both the automated and human digitisation process,
– random errors that occur in either the automated or human digitisation process, and
are endorsed rather than corrected by the reconciliation process,
– erroneous exclusion of ballot papers judged to be informal,
– accidental alterations, duplicates or omissions caused by software bugs,
7 https://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/counting/files/css-integrity.pdf
8 https://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/counting/files/senate-count.pdf
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– deliberate manipulation by malicious actors, either of the images (before digitisa-
tion) or of the preference data (from digitisation to publication).
Our investigation does not apply to the last two kinds of errors, which could be intro-
duced in a non-random way that worked for or against a particular candidate. It does
apply to the errors that are random. In particular, we show that digitisation errors that
randomly cause some ballots to be judged informal can impact candidates differently.
3 Experimental Design
Our analysis is performed on the AEC’s published data for the 2016 and 2019 Australian
federal elections for the Senate, i.e. the output of the process described in Section 2.2.
Ideally our analysis would be based upon the actual marks that voters made on their
ballots, or even what they intended to make, and the comparison with the AEC’s output.
However, these data are not available. Instead, we use the AEC’s output as the ‘actual’
ballot data, and add simulated errors.
3.1 Analysis code
For logistical reasons, and to make it easy for anyone to replicate this experiment, we
extract those preferences that are actually considered valid in the election. If a number
is not uniquely present in the preference marks, then it and all subsequent preferences
are disregarded. A standardised “.stv” file format is available for these elections at the
downloads section for the election at https://vote.andrewconway.org based
on the data published by the AEC. This common format does unfortunately mean that
we lose some (invalid) marks that could conceivably have become valid when we added
new random errors, or which could, through errors, invalidate earlier preferences.
We use the Java pseudo-random number generator java.util.Random to generate
random numbers, and ensured that different executions used different seeds. The pro-
gram used to implement the errors and compute the results of the elections is available
at https://github.com/SiliconEconometrics/PublicService
3.2 Error models
We simulate the effect of errors by making random changes to the votes. We have three
different models for errors:
– For each position on a valid preference list, truncate the list at that preference with
probability . This represents an error causing an invalid or repeated preference.
– Given a valid preference list, for each digit, with probability , replace that digit
with a randomly generated digit, which may be the original digit.
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– Given a set of pairwise error ratios for digits, that is ij , i, j ∈ 0 . . . 9, i 6= j is the
probability of misreading a digit i as a digit j, let i =
∑
j∈0..9,j 6=i ij . We roll the
dice for each digit i. If the dice is d < i we then replace it with the least digit k
where
∑
j∈0..k,j 6=i ij > d.
Note that in all three models, the probability of an error on the ballot increases with
the number of preferences listed on the ballot. We use the standard Java pseudorandom
number generator java.util.Random as the source of randomness. After applying errors,
formality rules are checked again, reducing the number of ballots considered for the
election.
4 What is a realistic error rate?
As far as we know, there are no publicly available results from any rigorous estimate
of Senate scanning random errors in Australia. However, there are several independent
estimates, which give us a per-digit error rate ranging from 0.01% to 0.38%.
We define an error to be a discrepancy between the paper ballot and the electronic
preference list output at the end of the process.
4.1 The Australian Electoral Commission’s estimate
The AEC does not conduct, nor allow anyone else to conduct, a statistically significant
random sample of Senate ballots for comparison between electronic and paper records.
However, an Australian National Audit Office report9 describes a limited process for
gaining an estimate. This process was conducted by AEC officials.
– A batch of 50 ballot papers was randomly selected and then six ballot papers from
that batch were reviewed;
– Compliance inspectors recorded the first six preferences from the physical ballot
paper on a checklist;
– Verification officers compared the preferences recorded on the checklist against
those on the scanned image of the ballot paper and those in the related XML file;
– The IT security team compiled, investigated and reported on the findings.
The compliance inspection report outlined that a total of 1,510 ballot papers were in-
spected and 4 processing errors were identified. This seems to indicate an error rate
of less than 0.3% per ballot. Although it wasn’t recorded how many preferences were
on each ballot, it seems to indicate a very small per-digit error rate. However, a care-
ful reading of that experimental description shows that the officials verified only the
9 https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/
aec-procurement-services-conduct-2016-federal-election
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numbers from 1 to 6. Errors in later preferences were ignored. So this estimate may
substantially underestimate the overall rate of error.
To estimate the per-digit error rate implied by these data, we assumed that all of the
1,510 ballot papers that were inspected had six preferences marked on them, giving a
total of 9,060 digits. We also assumed that the 4 ‘processing errors’ were each a single-
digit error. This gave a per-digit error rate of 0.04%, with a 95% confidence interval of
(0.01%, 0.11%).
In reality, some proportion of these ballot papers were likely to be informal and have
fewer than six preferences marked. Adjusting the above assumptions based on reported
rates of informality by the AEC10 had negligible impact on these estimates.
4.2 Informal experiment
For the 2019 federal election, we conducted an informal experiment amongst 15 of
our colleagues to get a rough estimate of the ‘end to end’ accuracy of the Senate vote
digitisation process. Each of our colleagues decided on their Senate vote ahead of the
election and made a private record of it for later comparison. On polling day, they each
carefully completed their Senate ballot paper in accordance with their planned vote.
After the election, it was possible to compare these against the electronic file of ballots
published by the AEC. Each of our colleagues searched for a vote that matched their
own vote either exactly or very closely.
All of our colleagues voted below the line in Victoria. Due to the very large number
of possible ways to vote below the line, each of their votes was extremely likely to be
unique. In addition, the electronic file from the AEC also recorded the polling booth for
each ballot. These two facts together allowed each of our colleagues to easily identify
their own ballot paper in the file and be confident that it was indeed their own. This was
true even if the match were not exact, since the next ‘closest’ matching ballot would
typically vary substantially from each person’s private record.
Of our 15 colleagues, 12 found ballots in the file that exactly matched their own records.
This indicates perfectly accurate digitisation. The remaining 3 found a mismatch: each
of them had a single one of their preferences recorded differently in the file than in
their private record. These mismatches could be due to an error in the AEC digitisation
process or to a transcription error on the part of our colleagues. However, they do give
us at least a rough estimate of accuracy.
What per-digit error rate does this imply? We use the following assumptions: a) Each
ballot had votes below the line; b) All boxes below the line were numbered; c) All of
the reported errors were for a single digit. These assumptions maximise the number of
possible digits and minimise the number of errors, and thus will give the lowest possible
error rate estimate. There were 82 candidates for Victoria. This gives 9+ 73× 2 = 155
digits per ballot, which is 155 × 15 = 2, 325 digits in total. Out of these, we have 3
10 For example, https://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/Informal_Voting/senate/
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Table 1: Pairwise error digit rates: the entry for row x and column y gives the percentage
chance of (mis)recognizing a digit y as a digit x. A dash − indicates less than 0.01%
chance of misrecognition
Actual
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 99.22 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.14 − 0.06 0.20
1 − 98.75 0.14 − − − − 0.40 0.04 0.08
2 0.12 0.28 99.56 0.24 − − − 0.18 0.02 0.10
3 − − 0.22 99.50 − − − 0.24 0.14 0.22
4 0.16 0.16 − − 98.65 0.08 0.10 − 0.12 0.30
5 − 0.02 − − − 99.52 0.22 0.10 0.18 0.12
6 0.10 0.12 − − 0.06 0.08 99.48 − 0.14 −
7 0.08 0.42 − 0.16 − 0.02 − 98.90 − 0.38
8 0.10 0.06 − − 0.48 − − − 99.16 0.26
9 0.22 0.20 − 0.08 0.72 0.26 0.06 0.18 0.14 98.34
single-digit errors. These give a per-digit error rate of 0.13%, and a 95% confidence
interval of (0.03%, 0.38%). Note that the error rate here will capture any errors either
by a voter or by the digitisation process, so it may overestimate the latter’s error rate.
4.3 What is the state of the art in digit recognition error rate?
Accurately recognizing handwritten digits by computer is an important consideration
for many applications where data crosses from the physical world into the digital. The
MNIST (Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology) database is a large
database of handwritten digits that is commonly used for training various image pro-
cessing systems. The database consists of digits written by high school students and
American Census Bureau employees, and normalised to be represented as grayscale
images of size 28 × 28 pixels. The current state of the art approach [1] to this dataset
has an error rate of 0.18%.11 Care must be taken with this result, which is on a well stud-
ied and well curated data set. While Australian ballot papers have boxes marked where
each number should be filled in, not all digits written in practice fall completely within
the box. Nevertheless, this gives an accurate lower bound on pure computer-based digit
recognition accuracy. The AEC process involves human inspection which means that it
may be able to achieve better overall digit recognition accuracy.
The errors in digit recognition are not uniform, some digits are easier to confuse, for
example 1 and 7. Most work on digit recognition does not publish the cross-digit con-
fusion rates. Table 1 gives a confusion table showing the percentage of each actual digit
versus its predicted value from experiments reported by Toghi & Grover [2]. The over-
all digit recognition error in this work is 0.89%, which is substantially greater than the
best results reported above.
11 There is unpublished work claiming 0.17%.
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4.4 Analysing the election data (NOT simulations) to infer the error rate
We only have the reported ballots, not the ones that were ruled informal. (Except of
course we cannot distinguish human mistakes from scanning errors.) Errors that make
the vote informal are hidden.
Recall that the formality rules require at least 6 unambiguous preferences below the
line, and that informal votes are not reported. We can estimate the number of hidden
informal votes by observing the erroneous but formal ones. We use the number of re-
peated or missing numbers greater than 6 to approximate the number of repeated or
missing numbers less than or equal to 6.
Table 2 shows the data, for BTL votes cast in Tasmania for the 2016 Senate election.
The first column is the preference p on the ballot. The second column is the number
of ballot papers that contain p more than once. The final column shows the number of
ballots missing that preference, showing preference p−1 and p+1 but not p. A 0 is not
required for p = 1. Note that there is a sudden drop at 12 because voters were instructed
to list at least 12 preferences, so many people listed exactly 12. If the 12th preference
was miswritten or misrecorded, then it did not count in our table (there being no 13).
There would be no informal BTL ballots at all, and perfect zeros in the first 6 rows of
Table 2, except for one special formality rule: if there is also a valid ATL vote present
on the same ballot paper, then it is counted instead, and both the valid ATL vote and
the invalid BTL markings are reported in the final database. Hence we expect that the
numbers in the first 6 rows are only a small fraction of the ballots rendered informal
by either human or scanning errors. There is a sudden increase at the 7th preference,
because BTL votes with a repeated or omitted 7th preference are still included in the
tally, as long as their first 6 preferences are unambiguous.
There are 97,685 published votes with BTL markings. Most of these were valid BTL
votes but some were only published as they had valid ATL votes as well. The most
representative preferences are probably 7 to 9, being single digits whose count is not
artificially suppressed due to repetitions in them causing the BTL vote to be informal
and thus usually not published. For these preference numbers, the observed repetitions
of that number are on the order of 0.5%. This doesn’t prove that the scanning process
introduces errors at a rate of 0.5% per digit, because they could be caused by voter error.
Also this could underestimate the scanner error rate because it includes only those not
rendered informal. Nevertheless this provides a rough estimate of voter plus process
error.
5 Results
5.1 Results from truncation and digit error models
We simulated counts with errors using the ballot data for all 8 states and territories
from both the 2016 and 2019 Senate elections. We used both the truncation and digit
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Table 2: Counts of repeated and missed preferences, Tasmanian ballots with BTL
marks, 2016.
Count of ballot papers that:
Preference Repeat that preference Skip the preference
1 573 240
2 385 43
3 303 54
4 231 49
5 212 45
6 211 37
7 492 130
8 494 133
9 542 134
10 372 193
11 256 203
12 250 45
13 122 44
error models, across a wide range of error probabilities. For any given choice of model
and error probability, we simulated 1,000 elections (each with their own random errors
under that model).
For error rates between 0% and 1%, the only election for which we observed any change
in the elected candidates was for Tasmania in 2016.
This election was somewhat unusual in three ways. First, it was a very close election,
with the difference in tallies between the final two remaining candidates, Nick McKim
and Kate McCulloch, being only 141 votes. For comparison, 285 votes were lost due
to rounding. Second, there was a popular labor candidate, Lisa Singh, who won a seat
despite being placed fourth on the party ticket, and the candidate above her not winning
a seat. This means she received many BTL votes specifically for her, rather than relying
on ATL votes for the party. Finally, the 2016 election was a double dissolution, which
means that twelve candidates were elected rather than the usual six.
In the real election, the 12th (final) candidate that was elected was Nick McKim. In
our simulations, once we introduced a small amount of error we saw that a different
candidate, Kate McCulloch, was sometimes elected instead. As we increased the per-
digit error rate from 0% to 1%, we saw a complete shift from one candidate to the other,
see Figure 2. The truncation error model led to the same outcome (data not shown).
5.2 Pairwise digit error model
For comparison with the other error models, we ran 1,000 simulations for Tasmania
2016 using the pairwise digit error model. Unlike the other models, we did not have a
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Fig. 2: Changing election outcomes as a function of error rate, Tasmanian Senate elec-
tion 2016. The lower graph shows a complete reversal for a small error rate (about
0.5%), between the state in which McKim wins consistently (no error) and that in
which McCulloch wins consistently (1% or greater error). The upper graph shows sim-
ilar behaviour for larger error rates—with error rates of more than 20% there are sharp
transitions between different election outcomes.
parameter to set but simply used the pairwise error rate matrix shown in Table 1. This
model has an average per-digit error rate of 0.89%.
Across the 1,000 simulations, we observed Kate McCulloch being elected 99.5% of the
time, and Nick McKim for the remaining 0.5%. This is consistent with the simple per-
digit error model, which also resulted in Nick McKim occasionally being elected when
the per-digit error was comparable.
5.3 Sharp transitions
The fact that such a sharp transition happens from electing one candidate to another was
initially surprising to us. Rather than simply ‘adding noise’ and leading to randomness
in which candidates got elected, the noise seems to be leading to a systematic bias
in favour or against specific candidates. This behaviour can be seen more clearly as
the error rate is increased to larger values (beyond values that would be plausible in
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Table 3: Partition of the Tasmanian 2016 ballots. The number of ballots split by
whether it is an above-the-line (ATL) or below-the-line (BTL) vote, and which candi-
date (if any) out of Kate McCulloch or Nick McKim is preferred over the other.
McCulloch McKim Neither
ATL 73,975 97,331 72,468
BTL 17,066 42,170 36,149
practice), see Figure 2, where sharp transitions are visible also at 28%, 36%, 62%,
68%, 82%, 86% and 97%.
To investigate possible reasons for this, we looked at how individual ballots were af-
fected by the simulated errors. Compared to the no-error scenario, two broad types of
outcome are possible:
– The ballot becomes informal and is not counted. This will happen when it does not
meet the formality requirements, for example does not have at least a single first
preference above the line or consecutive preferences numbered 1 to 6 below the
line.
– The ballot ends up exhausting before reaching a candidate. This will happen if
the preference order becomes disrupted due to an error, which has the effect of
truncating the preferences and not enabling the ballot to be counted in favour of
any candidates further down the preference list.
We investigated both of these effects specifically in the context of the Tasmanian 2016
election; we report on this in the next few sections. We found that the first type of effect
was the dominant factor in determining the election outcome.
5.4 Why random errors affect different candidates differently (Tasmania 2016)
We saw earlier that for small error rates, we have either Nick McKim (from the Aus-
tralian Greens party) or Kate McCulloch (from the One Nation Party) elected as the
final candidate.
There were 339,159 formal ballots for this election. For each one, we looked at the
preferences to see:
– whether it was an ATL or a BTL vote,
– which of the above two candidates (or their respective parties, if it was an ATL
vote) was more highly preferred, or neither one.
Table 3 shows how the ballots split into these categories. The most important fact to
note is the relative number of ATL and BTL votes in favour of each candidate: more
than 80% of the ballots in favour of McCulloch were ATL votes, while for McKim it
was less than 70%.
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Fig. 3: How the per-digit error rate affects the formality of votes after random errors are
applied, comparing above-the-line (ATL) and below-the-line (BTL) votes.
When errors are introduced, ballots that were BTL votes were much more likely to be-
come informal. Figure 3 illustrates this: the larger the error rate, the greater the disparity
in how many of the ATL or BTL ballots became informal. This on its own is enough to
explain the systematic shift from McKim to McCulloch as error rates increase.
For more insight, we took a closer look at the simulations that used a per-digit error rate
of 1%. For each ballot, we define the formality rate to be the proportion of simulations
for which it remained formal. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the formality rate across
different types of ballots. The left panel shows the clear disparity between ATL and BTL
votes. This reiterates the difference we saw on average from Figure 3, but in addition
we see that this disparity is very consistent across individual ballots (from the very little
overlap for the ATL and BTL ballots).
When we further divided the ballots based on where in the preference list the voters
placed their preferred candidate out of McKim or McCulloch, the distribution of for-
mality rates was relatively consistent (right panel of Figure 4).
This indicates that the major factor leading to McCulloch replacing McKim is simply
the lower formality rate for BTL votes, after random errors were added, coupled with
the fact that a larger proportion of ballots in favour of McKim were BTL votes.
Of more academic curiosity, for the less plausible larger errors, the sharp transitions
came from new effects causing biases against major parties, who lost out as randomi-
sation of preferences reduced their typical large first preference collection. This also
caused major parties to not get multiple candidates elected in the first counting round,
which meant that major party candidates low down on the party ticket tended to get
eliminated before they could get preferences passed on to them, as they were reliant on
14 Blom et al.
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Fig. 4: Formality rates for votes with random errors injected, graphed by ATL/BTL
(left panel) or by the position of the preferred candidate (right panel). Error rates vary
greatly between ATL and BTL votes, but not much between preferences within those
categories.
BTL votes to avoid being eliminated before the first candidates of minor parties who
could get ATL votes.
5.5 Varying the formality requirements
The formality requirements differ for ATL and BTL votes. In particular, BTL votes
require at least 6 consecutive preferences in order to be declared formal, whereas ATL
votes only require a single preference. This is one reason why the formality rate is lower
once errors are introduced.
We investigated whether changing the formality rules could ameliorate the systematic
bias caused by the introduction of errors. Specifically, we varied the number of consec-
utive preferences required for a formal BTL vote, ranging from 1 (i.e. the same as ATL
votes) to 9 (i.e. more stringent than the current rules).
Figure 5 shows the impact of these choices on the election outcome, by reporting how
often McCulloch was elected instead of McKim. We see that, in this case, making the
formality requirement less stringent reduced the bias, and once the formality rules were
in alignment for both ATL and BTL votes, the election result remains mostly unchanged
even in the presence of errors.
5.6 Truncation of preferences
Other than causing ballots to become informal, errors can result in votes not being
counted for certain candidates if the error truncates the preference order. Candidates
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Fig. 5: The effect of formality rules on election outcomes. As the number of prefer-
ences required for a valid BTL vote increases, so does the rate at which BTL votes
are excluded due to random errors. This produces a faster transition from one winning
candidate to another as the error rate increases.
16 Blom et al.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
ATL
Preference for preferred candidate's party
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f b
al
lo
ts l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
BTL
Preference for preferred candidate
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l
l
Preferred candidate
McCulloch
McKim
Fig. 6: Histogram of preference number (normalised to below-the-line equivalent)
where each candidate occurs on the ballots that involve them.
that obtain more of their votes from later (higher-numbered) preferences should be more
greatly affected by such truncation.
We investigated whether this might be occurring in our simulations. For each ballot, we
compared the number of valid preferences before and after any simulated errors. There
was a clear signal of truncation: ballots that had around 60 valid preferences (which
were all BTL votes) only had on average around 30 valid preferences remaining when
the per-digit error was set to 1%. In contrast, ballots that only had 10 valid preferences
(irrespective of whether they were ATL or BTL votes) continued to have almost 10 valid
preferences on average.
While this extent of truncation is stark, it might not necessarily lead to any change in
the election outcome because many of the later preferences might not actually be used
during the election count.
In the case of the Tasmanian 2016 election, we looked at ballots in favour of each of
McKim and McCulloch to see whether they tended to get their votes from earlier or
later preferences. Figure 6 shows the distribution of these.
Interestingly, we see that McCulloch relies more on later preferences than McKim.
Therefore, it is McKim rather than McCulloch that should benefit from any truncation
effect. This works in the reverse direction of the formality-induced bias described ear-
lier, however the truncation did not act strongly enough to reverse that bias.
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6 Conclusion
The previous section clearly demonstrates that random errors during counting do not
necessarily lead to ‘random’ election outcomes. We were very surprised by the sharp
transitions in election results as error rates changed, illustrated in Figure 2. Systematic
biases can arise due to interactions with the election rules.
For Australian Senate elections, a key factor is the formality requirements. BTL votes
have more stringent requirements, which ends up creating a systematic bias against BTL
votes in the presence of random errors. Candidates who rely on BTL votes (e.g. if they
are relying on their individual popularity) will be more affected by random errors than
those relying on ATL votes (e.g. via membership of their party). Changing the formality
requirements to reduce the disparity between ATL and BTL votes also reduces this bias.
Candidates who rely on accumulating later preferences are more affected by random
errors than candidates who rely primarily on their first-preference votes. However, this
effect was much weaker than the bias induced by differences in formality requirements.
These results raise questions about how formality rules should be specified in order to be
fair to candidates with different voting patterns. Arguably more relaxed formality rules
could be applied which are less likely to have such strong differences across different
kinds of votes. For example, perhaps a BTL vote should be formal if the first 6 most
preferred candidates are clear, even if they are not numbered from 1 to 6, e.g. a vote
with preferences 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and no preference 3 still gives a clear ranking of the first
6 candidates.
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